In a notice signed last week by Kristi Noem, U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, the U.S. cited “plans for free and fair elections” in Myanmar in its decision to end Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for nationals of Myanmar currently residing in the United States. 

Critics say that a free and fair election is impossible — the military only controls a small fraction of the country and has spent the last four years eliminating political opposition, jailing proponents of democracy, and waging war against the civilian population. 

DHS estimates the end of TPS will affect 3,969 current approved beneficiaries residing in the U.S. Under the announcement, they will be expected to leave the country or secure another lawful status by January 26, 2026. 

“The  Secretary has determined,” the notice says, summing up its conclusion, that “conditions no longer hinder the safe return of aliens who are nationals of Burma to the country,” adding that “continuing to permit the Burmese nationals to remain temporarily in the United States is contrary to the U.S. national interest.” 

Election Concerns 

Myanmar is currently ruled by a military junta that forcefully seized control from a civilian government in February 2021. The Tatmadaw, as the military is called locally, controls only about 20% of the country; the remainder consists of highly contested territory or areas under the control of various rebel militias, estimated at 42% of the country. 

Acknowledging the prevalence of rebel-held territory, the DHS notice from last week hailed the armed ethnic groups that have established, “in parallel with the national political process … local and ethnic administrations, which have made tangible gains in governance and public services, signaling broader improvements in Burma’s stability.” 

Human rights watchdogs and relief organizations report from the ground that the Tatmadaw regularly bombs rebel-held areas, including places of worship, schools, and medical facilities. These bombing raids displace entire villages and decimate towns across the country, highlighting the threat that these separatist areas pose to the Tatmadaw’s quest for control. 

A recent census, conducted by the Tatmadaw to prepare for elections scheduled for later this month, achieved complete counts in only 145 of 330 townships across the country, and experts doubt the Tatmadaw can conduct full counts even in many of those areas. 

In addition to concerns about access to the polls, issues abound regarding opposition access to the ballot in the first place. 

The Tatmadaw passed the Political Party Registration Law in 2024, requiring all political parties to re-register and barring anyone previously convicted of a crime from joining a party. Other new requirements included that parties must consist of at least 100,000 members and operate a national apparatus. 

In effect, these rules barred any effective political opposition leading up to this month’s election. The junta has jailed more than 30,000 political prisoners since taking power in 2021, including pro-democracy activists and opposition leaders from the former ruling party. 

The election commission, controlled by the junta, has sweeping discretion to dissolve parties without appeal. The former ruling party, the National League for Democracy, was dissolved by the election commission after refusing to register under the new rules. 

As it stands today, the elections seem poised to proceed without meaningful opposition representation on the ballot or at the polls. 

Growing Humanitarian Concerns 

Secretary Noem’s notice acknowledges that “Burma continues to face humanitarian challenges due in part to continued military operations against armed resistance and the need for humanitarian assistance,” but concludes that there have been sufficient “improvements in [Myanmar’s] governance and stability” at the national and local levels as to warrant the return of Burmese nationals currently protected by the TPS designation. 

More than 3.6 million people are currently internally displaced in Myanmar, according to U.N. statistics. 

The Tatmadaw continues to support an ethnoreligious genocide against the Rohingya Muslim community, mostly concentrated in Rakhine state. More than a million have fled the persecution since the genocide escalated in 2017. In the 18 months leading up to July 2025, about 150,000 Rohingya refugees fled to neighboring Bangladesh, representing the largest influx since 2017 and indicating continued danger for ethnoreligious minorities in Myanmar. 

In March, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) released a report criticizing the Tatmadaw for its systematic repression of religious minorities and urging the international community to increase attention to the plight of the persecuted in Myanmar. 

“The country has seen the displacement of over 3.5 million people in recent years,” the USCIRF report noted, “including more than 90,000 in Christian-majority Chin State, 237,200 in Kachin State, and one million Muslim-majority Rohingya refugees.” 

Though a large majority of the population is ethnic Burman and an even greater percentage is Buddhist, the communities that make up the remainder are well-established, well-organized, and, for the most part, predate the formation of the modern state by centuries. 

In many cases, Myanmar’s ethnic minorities have taken on a distinct religious identity as well. About 20% to 30% of ethnic Karen are Christians, while other groups — such as the Chin — are more than 90% Christian. This overlap of ethnic and religious identity has created a volatile situation for believers. 

Representing an extremist interpretation of Buddhism, the Burmese military has a long history of violence against the people of Myanmar, including against ethnic and religious minorities like the Muslim-majority Rohingya and Christian-majority Chin. 

The junta is known to abduct children, forcing them to walk ahead of their troops through minefields. In many cases, their victims are members of ethnic and religious minority communities fighting back against the atrocities of a military that has waged a decades-long war of ethnic and religious cleansing. 

History of Broken Ceasefires 

The DHS notice praises the military junta for engaging in ceasefire negotiations with armed ethnic militias, citing the ceasefire agreed upon after devastating earthquakes in 2025 as an example of the junta’s ability to negotiate in good faith. 

When a devastating earthquake hit Myanmar in March, the junta launched airstrikes on civilian rescue crews just hours after the earthquake struck. In contrast to the junta, the National Unity Government — which opposes the junta — quickly announced a ceasefire to facilitate humanitarian activities. 

The earthquake left 3,800 people dead and more than 5,000 injured, according to the U.N. 

While the junta did eventually join the ceasefire agreement, it repeatedly broke it, according to civil society and media sources, including the acclaimed open-source research group Bellingcat, which documented many villages bombed by the junta in violation of the ceasefire agreement. 

In the first three weeks of the ceasefire alone, the U.N. tracked at least 172 junta attacks, including airstrikes and artillery assaults. 

The fact that the military junta, known locally as the Tatmadaw, would bomb civilians while they were working to rescue each other from the rubble of an earthquake is “nothing short of incredible,” Tom Andrews, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, told the BBC shortly after the earthquake. 

“Anyone who has influence on the [Tatmadaw],” he said, “needs to step up the pressure and make it very clear that this is not acceptable.” 

International Condemnation of Upcoming Elections 

While Russia, China, and India have supported the junta both internally and internationally, few countries globally have recognized the regime, and it remains sidelined by ASEAN, a key regional bloc. 

The country’s military rulers see the election, planned for later this month, as a potential step toward legitimizing their rule and as their best chance to gain broad international recognition. 

Analysts warn the election is likely to be a sham, designed to consolidate the junta’s power. The regime controls only a limited portion of the country and lacks the logistical capacity to conduct free and fair elections in opposition-held areas. It has imprisoned or killed thousands of opposition figures, pro-democracy activists, and journalists, and has shown no signs of easing restrictions ahead of the vote. 

At a July ASEAN meeting, Malaysian Foreign Minister Mohamad — representing Malaysia in the rotating ASEAN chairmanship — characterized Myanmar’s upcoming election as premature, urging instead a focus on ending violence and fostering inclusive dialogue. 

“We advised Myanmar that an election is not a priority for now,” Hasan said. “The priority is to cease all violence … so that all parties can sit together.” 

In September, the foreign ministers of Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines suddenly cancelled a planned visit to Myanmar. The delegation had been set to discuss the country’s upcoming elections before being turned away by a military junta that appears resistant to outside input on the December vote. 

Contrary to this skepticism about the elections, Russia and China have led the way in supporting the planned vote. 

China has publicly reiterated its support for the election, promising “technical assistance” for the junta’s census and voter-roll efforts, and expressing backing for what it calls a legitimate “domestic political process.” 

Meanwhile, Russia has signed cooperation agreements with the regime’s election commission and committed to sending observers, offering political cover, and signaling that the military’s agenda retains powerful allies. 

Beijing and Moscow’s support — grounded in strategic, economic, and regional-security interests — gives the junta diplomatic insulation, material support, and a veneer of legitimacy that rights monitors argue masks the reality of widespread repression, territorial fragmentation, and electoral manipulation. 

Should the U.S. continue to align with Russia and China in support of the planned elections, other countries may be pressured to follow suit, thereby relieving pressure on the junta. In such a scenario, Myanmar’s ethnoreligious minority communities will likely face increased violence from a reinvigorated Tatmadaw. 

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